Does Free Speech Have Limits?
Should there be limits on speech and expression, and are the limits that we now legally recognize the right ones?
John Stuart Mill’s classic defense of free speech in his 1859 essay “On Liberty” endorses strong but not unlimited protections — but for reasons that many have come to question. Any silencing of what we now call political speech would be socially harmful, he wrote, in that it would deprive us of the opportunity to exchange error for truth. Truth, Mill was convinced, is essential for society to progress, and he thought that it emerged “in collision with error.”
But some speech can be divisive. “Hate speech” refers to highly offensive forms of expression designed to denigrate, divide or incite. Some now call for stricter limits on such speech. To the extent that speech potentially incites violence, Mill allowed for restrictions on the time, manner and place of its utterance, but not its content (a distinction now enshrined in First Amendment law). Mill thought people should be allowed to express ideas that others find offensive, including those that denigrate and divide. Silencing speech that is merely offensive would lead to repression of dissent and stifle diversity of thought, especially as those in power often take offense at challenges to the social order.
Few now believe that truth necessarily emerges from unfettered speech, as Mill thought it would. Too much contemporary speech is designed to misinform and mislead, or to foster animus and resentment. We as a society are less informed, and less civil, from having to hear speech of this kind. But, as Mill warned, when we try to silence this kind of speech, we often miss our target, repressing legitimate expression. Improving our ability to recognize and combat misinformation, while resisting and condemning speech laden with animus or resentment, offers a better solution than restricting its content.
Steve Vanderheiden is a Boulder professor of political science.
Illustration by Kara Fellows